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ABSTRACT According to manipulationist accounts of causal explanation, to explain an 
event is to show how it could be changed by intervening on its cause. The relevant 
change must be a ‘serious possibility’ claims Woodward 2003, distinct from mere log-
ical or physical possibility—approximating something I call ‘scientific possibility’. 
This idea creates significant difficulties: background knowledge is necessary for judg-
ments of possibility. Yet the primary vehicles of explanation in manipulationism are 
‘invariant’ generalisations, and these are not well adapted to encoding such knowledge, 
especially in the social sciences, as some of it is non-causal. Ceteris paribus (CP) laws 
or generalisations labour under no such difficulty. A survey of research methods such 
as case and comparative studies, randomised control trials, ethnography, and structural 
equation modeling, suggests that it would be more difficult and in some instances im-
possible to try to represent the output of each method in invariant generalisations; and 
that this is because in each method causal and non-causal background knowledge mesh 
in a way that cannot easily be accounted for in manipulationist terms. Ceteris paribus-
generalisations being superior in this regard, a theory of explanation based on the latter 








The problem of implicit background knowledge, like a bugbear, stalks many areas 
of the philosophy of science and epistemology. It troubles studies of confirmation,1 
                                               
1 Popper 1963, 1976, Hempel 1966, 1988, Mackie 1969, Watkins 1960, 1987. 
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knowledge,2 the relationship between observation and scientific theory,3 the formalisa-
tion of the latter,4 causal modelling and inference,5 expertise,6 learning theory,7 expla-
nation,8 and many more. Any attempt to drive it out of all of its hiding places simulta-
neously would be a Herculean task, so I will focus on the last item on this list, back-
ground knowledge in explanation—although some of what follows is likely to be rele-
vant elsewhere as well. Implicit or tacit background knowledge plays an indispensable, 
albeit not always explicitly theorised or even fully acknowledged, role in a number of 
philosophical accounts of scientific explanation. C. G. Hempel, for example, faced with 
prima facie decisive counterexamples to his deductive-nomological (DN) model of ex-
planation, famously brushed these off with the observation that explanations can satisfy 
the adequacy conditions of his model despite being ‘practically useless’ (Hempel 1965: 
425ff). The issue of practical usefulness was not the business of philosophy of science 
in Hempel’s eyes, but rather of ‘pragmatics’, so he did not concern himself with it much 
further.9 Yet pragmatic analyses of explanation typically show that whether a given 
body of information is explanatory depends directly on the nature of the background 
knowledge of the audience, as well as its contextual interests (see e.g. van Fraassen 
1980: ch. 5, Achinstein 1983).  
Similarly, a primary difficulty for W. Salmon’s Causal-Mechanical model of ex-
planation (Salmon 1984) is that of explanatory relevance: it seems that without the right 
kind of background information we cannot insure that our causal explanations pick out 
only those causal processes/interactions that are explanatorily relevant to the explanan-
dum (see Hitchcock 1995). The late Salmon thought that information about causal pro-
cesses in conjunction with statistical relevance relationships would solve this problem 
(Salmon 1997: 476), but acknowledged that there is an epistemic worry: when consid-
ering the statistical relevance of a cause C and background conditions A to the effect B 
‘we must consider whether A.C constitutes a homogenous reference class, or whether 
there are other factors D, E, F that are also relevant to the occurrence of B’ (ibid.). 
Happily, ‘such questions are open to empirical investigation’.10 Thus we find that in a 
causal explanation of why C causes B we must appeal to a condition of homogeneity, 
                                               
2 Polanyi 1962, Peacocke 1998, Davies 2000. 
3 Duhem 1906, 1991, Quine 1951, Hanson 1958, Kuhn 1962, Strevens 2001. 
4 Kuipers 2001; Kamps 2005. 
5 Robins and Wasserman 1999, Cartwright 2007, van Gerven and Lucas 2007, Bonnefon, Da 
Silva Neves et al. 2008, Borboudakis and Tsamardinos 2012. 
6 Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986, Collins and Evans 2007. 
7 Tenenbaum, Griffiths et al. 2006, van Gerven and Lucas 2007 
8 Hempel 1965, van Fraassen 1977, 1980, Achinstein 1983, Woodward 2003. 
9 Hempel also considered the difference between explanation and prediction to be purely prag-
matic (Hempel 1965: 249). 
10 See Woodward 2014 for scepticism about whether Salmon’s last proposal can work. 
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or a ceteris paribus condition, established empirically on the basis of our background 
knowledge about the relevance of A as well as a potentially indeterminate number of 
additional factors D, E, F… This background knowledge may or may not be causal 
itself, since statistical relevance factors may or may not be—a recurring theme in the 
present paper. 
An important contemporary development of causal accounts of explanation is ‘ma-
nipulationism.’ Arguably the most worked out statement of the view is Woodward 
2003, who proposes a notion of causal explanation according to which explanations are 
causal when they show how an outcome—the instantiation of a certain property or 
quantity expressible as a numerical magnitude—depends on the instantiation of other 
such properties or quantities.11 The dependence in question is not merely logical or 
conceptual: causal explanations are meant to provide information about how we can 
change a given outcome by changing the property on which it depends (Woodward 
2003: 10), thereby enabling the manipulation and control of nature. Since a causal re-
lationship can obtain and an explanation based on the latter be given even in circum-
stances where actual manipulation of the cause is impossible, the relevant information 
is counterfactual, and the control provided by it often of a merely ‘in principle’ kind. 
Successful explanations, Woodward says, are associated with ‘a hypothetical or coun-
terfactual experiment that shows us that and how manipulation of the factors mentioned 
in the explanation […] would be a way of manipulating or altering the phenomenon 
explained’ (Woodward 2003: 11). Causal explanations, in other words, answer ‘what-
if-things-had-been-different questions’ by highlighting ‘the difference for the explanan-
dum if the factors cited in the explanans had been different’ (ibid.).  
Manipulationism thus conceptualises causation as a special kind of counterfactual 
dependence, and cashes out causal explanation as a matter of the discovery and descrip-
tion of patterns of such dependence via ‘invariant’ generalisations.12 One of Wood-
ward’s central theoretical concerns is to favourably contrast his account with regularity 
theories of causation and the DN-model of explanation: he highlights the relative defi-
ciencies of the DN-model when compared to manipulationism, and emphasises prob-
lems with the explanatory use of laws of nature (conceived traditionally as exception-
less regularities) when compared to such use of invariant generalisations (Woodward 
2003: 152-186 and 265-288). Contemporary refinements of the regularist account es-
pecially as applied to the social sciences in the form of the theory of hedged or ceteris 
                                               
11 Earlier manipulationist accounts are Collingwood 1940 and von Wright 1971; contemporary 
contributions include Hausman 1998, Hitchcock 2001, as well as Woodward and Hitchcock 
2003 and Hitchcock and Woodward 2003, and Ylikoski and Kuorikoski 2010. 
12 Woodward in recent work uses ‘interventionist’ to refer to his theory of causation (Wood-
ward 2009, 2014, 2015). 
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paribus generalisations come in for particular criticism. The approach is ‘fundamen-
tally flawed’, Woodward claims, and ‘an appreciation of these flaws […] bring[s] out 
the superiority of the [manipulationist] account’ (Woodward 2003: 308).  
The aim of this paper is to show that Woodward’s programmatic claim that mani-
pulationism ‘fit[s] a wide range of scientific contexts, especially in the social and be-
havioral sciences’ (Woodward 2003: 6, my emphasis) is mistaken, and by the same 
token to defend and advocate the explanatory use of ceteris paribus generalisations in 
those contexts. I will argue (Section 1) that Woodward’s key notion of ‘serious possi-
bility’ underemphasises the problem of the quantity and variety of background 
knowledge necessary for causal explanation; and that this reduces manipulationism’s 
suitability as a theory of how we come to construct social scientific explanations on the 
basis of that knowledge. Section 2 shows why Woodward’s objections to ceteris pari-
bus-generalisations as a vehicle for scientific explanation fail, ironically despite the fact 
that the ceteris paribus-concept itself is at the very core of manipulationism. Section 3, 
finally, argues that the role of background knowledge in core social scientific meth-
ods—case- and comparative studies, randomised controlled trials, ethnographic studies, 
and structural equation modeling—suggests that a non-interventionist notion of expla-
nation based on ceteris paribus-generalisations provides a better fit. 
 
 
1. Of boulders and bugbears 
 
Manipulationism as sketched above rests on two central concepts, ‘intervention’ 
and ‘invariance’. An ‘intervention’ captures in non-anthropomorphic terms the ‘condi-
tions that would need to be met in an ideal experimental manipulation of the value of X 
performed for the purpose of determining whether X causes Y’ (Woodward 2003: 14), 
where X and Y are variables that range over types and take on numerical values that 
denote the magnitude of a given quantity. In an intervention, the putative causal factor 
X is set to a specific value in such a way that X becomes causally and probabilistically 
independent of its previous cause(s); and the endogenous causal relationships that de-
termined its value prior to the intervention are replaced wholly by an exogenous causal 
process, without however affecting X’s causal relationship with Y.13 The change in X 
effected by the intervention must be such that if any change occurs in Y as a result of it, 
it is due to Y’s relationship to X and not to any other factor (Woodward 2003: 747). In 
other words, an intervention is, as Michael Strevens memorably put it, ‘the result of the 
hand of God descending and directly tweaking the relevant factor’, altering it and only 
it with no side effects (Strevens 2007: 234); or in Judea Pearl’s metaphor, it is akin to 
                                               
13 Woodward credits among others Frisch 1995 [1938], Haavelmo 1944, Spirtes, Glymour et 
al. 1993, and Pearl 2000 with different variants of the concept.  
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‘surgery’ (Pearl 2000: 240, 347). ‘Interventionism’ stipulates that all genuine relations 
of cause and effect are such that the effect is susceptible to be changed through this sort 
of modification of its cause.  
The concept of ‘invariance’ joined to that of an intervention yields manipulation-
ism. A causal generalisation G that relates changes in the value of X to changes in the 
value of Y is invariant if G would continue to hold under an intervention on X, in the 
sense that G correctly describes how the value of Y would change as a result of this 
intervention (Woodward 2003: 239ff). ‘Invariance under interventions’ comes in de-
grees. At one end of the spectrum are fundamental physical laws that hold under all or 
almost all conditions and are invariant under a very wide range of interventions; at the 
other are (some) social science generalisations that are invariant under only a few in-
terventions and hold only under a narrow and local set of conditions. (For example, 
regression equations correlating editorial newspaper endorsements and change in vot-
ing patterns, Woodward 2003: 207, 241). A generalisation’s invariance is thus a func-
tion of the range of interventions under which it holds and the variation in the ‘back-
ground conditions’ over which it holds—by which Woodward intends changes in spa-
tiotemporal location and other initial or boundary conditions that are not explicitly cited 
in G (Woodward 2003: 254). The wider the range of interventions and background 
changes under which G remains invariant, the better (‘deeper’) any explanation that 
deploys it.14 Successful explanation according to manipulationism is a matter of dis-
playing patterns of counterfactual dependence via generalisations that are as invariant 
as possible, the depth of the explanation they afford being a function of the range of 
‘what-if-things-had-been-different?’ questions they answer (Woodward 2003: 193ff). 
Woodward runs into a spot of trouble as he fleshes out the details of his account, 
however. In response to cases where manipulationism risks yielding counterintuitive 
outcomes, namely the boulder example due to Hall 2004 (see Woodward 2003: 79-81) 
and the similar cricket ball case due to McDermott 1995 (see Woodward 2003: 86-87), 
he acknowledges that ‘conclusions about causal relationships are sensitive to one’s 
choice of representation’ (Woodward 2003: 80). In particular, our conclusion that A 
causes B will in many situations depend on which variables we choose for our repre-
sentation of the causal system in which A and B are embedded, and this choice, in turn, 
can depend on what we consider to be a ‘serious possibility’ in that causal situation 
(Woodward 2003: 86). For instance, take the case of a mountain hiker surviving the fall 
of a boulder by ducking in time; had she not ducked, she would have died. Manipula-
tionism risks yielding the result that the boulder’s fall can be said to have caused her 
survival, and that its failure to fall would have caused her death (rather than the reverse), 
if we include an additional variable representing a second boulder in our representation 
                                               
14 For criticism of this conception of ‘explanatory depth’, see e.g. Strevens 2009; Imbert 2013. 
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of the situation, and arrange things in a just-so manner. Namely, a second boulder po-
sitioned in such a way that its fall at the right time would have killed the hiker were it 
not for the fall of the first—which the hiker happens to notice, causing her to duck and 
to thereby avoid both boulders. In such a situation, an intervention that stops the first 
boulder from falling would successfully manipulate whether or not the hiker survives 
the fall of the second, yielding the intuitively unappealing result above (see Woodward 
2003: 79-80). Intuition might concede that the first boulder’s fall was an indirect or 
‘contributing’ cause of her survival, but it seems to balk at calling it its ‘actual’ cause, 
as Woodward is committed to do.15  
Woodward dismisses the two-boulder scenario by pointing out that in order to ar-
rive at the unwelcome conclusion we need to assume a causal system very different 
from the one initially intended. For there is no way that a falling boulder could cause 
or explain a hiker’s survival in a system involving just that one boulder, and no way 
that it not falling could cause or explain her death (Woodward 2003: 81). Yet this ob-
servation obviously cannot be the end of the discussion. Manipulationism does not in 
principle disallow changes in causal structure when assessing the truth-value of causal 
counterfactuals. For instance, we legitimately use Coulomb’s law to explain the 
strength and form of the electromagnetic field created by a live electrical wire, because 
the law holds in the system whose behaviour is being explained, a straight copper wire, 
as well as in countless other causal systems: wires made of other materials, other 
shapes, experimental setups, etc. (Woodward 2003: 241). In fact, change of causal 
                                               
15 See Woodward 2003: 79. Woodward defines a type variable X as a direct cause of type var-
iable Y relative to a variable set V iff a possible intervention on X will change Y or its probability 
distribution while all other variables in V are held fixed at some value (Woodward 2003: 59, 
emphasis mine). Using this definition he says that X’s taking value x is an actual cause of Y’s 
taking value y, iff X = x and Y = y (i.e. the change actually takes place) and ‘there is at least one 
route R from X to Y for which an intervention on X will change the value of Y or its probability 
distribution, given that other direct causes Zi of Y that are not on this route have been fixed at 
their actual values’ (where ‘x’ and ‘y’ range over particulars, and ‘R’ refers to a directed path, 
defined as an ordered set of variables Z1 … Zn such that X is a direct cause of Z1, Zn is a direct 
cause of Y, and for all 1 ≤ i > n in between, Zi is a direct cause of Zi + 1) (Woodward 2003: 77). 
He calls X a contributing cause of Y with respect to V iff ‘there is a directed path from X to 
Y’(Woodward 2003: 57).  
The rather complex definition of ‘actual cause’ successfully explains how transitivity of actual 
causation fails in the one-boulder-scenario. The fall of the boulder is an actual cause of the 
ducking, and the ducking an actual cause of survival, but the fall cannot be an actual cause of 
survival: given that the hiker ducked, an intervention on the boulder falling would make no 
difference to her survival; and there being (in that scenario) no other direct causes of survival 
on a route that bypasses her ducking, ‘there is no well-defined operation of fixing such varia-
bles’ in order to evaluate the influence of the boulder’s fall via the route that does not bypass it 
(Woodward 2003: 80; see also Hitchcock 2001: 276ff). The two-boulder-scenario provides 
such a route, however, and needs to be ruled out. Some audiences, incidentally, declare no 
discomfort with calling the fall of the first boulder the actual cause of the hiker’s survival in 
that scenario; they appear however to be in the minority. 
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structure is one of the dimensions along which causal generalisations must be invariant 
in order to be considered explanatory in the first place, so this cannot be why we must 
disregard the two-boulder-scenario when assessing counterfactual dependencies in the 
one-boulder-scenario.  
Enter ‘serious possibility’. Woodward suggests that in certain instances the rele-
vant change in structure is just too substantial to accept the possibilities it generates as 
‘serious’ (Woodward 2003: 86). This immediately generates the question: what degrees 
of change are consistent with ‘serious possibility’, and more generally, what are the 
factors that make a possibility ‘serious’? Woodward offers a list of ‘considerations’ that 
he says are relevant to this question: (1) the probability of an event’s occurrence ‘given 
the actual obtaining background conditions [or] those that usually or commonly obtain 
in similar situations’; (2) moral requirements, expectations, and custom; (3) whether an 
outcome is controllable (or easily or cheaply controllable) by current technology; (4) 
an investigator’s interests and purposes. Given the nature of the items in this list, he 
concedes that there is unlikely to be an algorithm for determining serious possibility 
(Woodward 2003: 88-89). That seems correct: (3) is historically contingent, and some 
elements of (2) and (4) would appear to be highly subjective. More importantly for my 
purposes, (2)-(4) do not address the question of the degree of counterfactual change in 
causal structure that is permissible.  
(1) appears to do so at first blush, by speaking of background conditions that ‘usu-
ally obtain in similar situations’. But we have no metric by which to objectively meas-
ure the relevant similarity, such that a causal scenario S2 in which background condi-
tions vary slightly, but foreground conditions are identical to S1, would qualify as sim-
ilar enough to be included in our causal evaluation of S1; neither do we have a principled 
way to specify what ought to count as ‘background’ and ‘foreground’ in each case. 
Woodward certainly provides no formal criterion of similarity, but merely appeals to 
the intuition that the two-boulder-scenario is too different to be included as relevant in 
our causal calculus regarding the one-boulder-scenario. At the same time, he acknowl-
edges that we need to limit the number of counterfactual situations we are allowed to 
consider when assessing causality and invariance: ‘if we don’t appeal to some notion 
like that of serious possibility, a manipulability theory will at the very least be led to 
causal judgments that are different from those that are ordinarily accepted’ (Woodward 
2003: 89).  
Does ‘serious possibility’ amount to nothing more than an appeal to raw causal 
intuition, then? Woodward notes that while some aspects of the concept are clearly 
subjective, others are very much objective (Woodward 2003: 90). True enough, it is an 
objective fact, say, that mountain boulders qua macroscopic objects are not subject to 
quantum mechanical laws, therefore the likelihood of a boulder suddenly appearing at 
a new spatiotemporal location is near zero. But judgments of objective probability are 
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of course sensitive to the scientific theory being used to make those judgments. Wood-
ward gives short shrift not just to the question when two causal systems are sufficiently 
similar for us to be justified to transfer our judgments of probability from one to the 
other, he says nothing at all about the theory-relativity of such judgments. In the social 
domain, at which manipulationism is explicitly aimed, our knowledge of causal struc-
tures is often very limited, and so are our causal intuitions. In many cases we cannot 
base our estimates of the probability of an event or of the seriousness of a possibility 
on pre-theoretical causal knowledge or intuitions, because what we think seriously pos-
sible depends entirely on which relevant theory we accept. For example, our assessment 
of the probability of a social group’s economic status being affected by the content of 
the group’s religious beliefs depends on whether we subscribe to a Weberian vs. a clas-
sical Marxist sociological paradigm—just as our assessment of the likelihood of light 
deflection by massive objects depends on whether we operate in Newtonian mechanics 
or relativistic physics.  
Sometimes, scientific judgments of possibility are indirectly supported by theories 
from other disciplines—political claims by economic theory or vice versa, psychologi-
cal ones by biology, sociological ones by history, etc.—or depend on case-specific and 
non-causal background knowledge from those fields (as e.g. in Woodward’s consider-
ation (2)). In other cases what we think possible does not depend at all on what could 
occur according to our currently held scientific theories, because in thought experi-
ments it may be indeterminate whether an event is possible under those theories (see El 
Skaf 2017: 20-21), but rather on newly hypothesised ones. Therefore, if it is to be sci-
entifically useful at all the concept of ‘serious possibility’ can neither be collapsed into 
narrow nomological possibility, where this refers to the set of counterfactuals supported 
by currently known and accepted scientific laws, nor be identified too broadly with 
conceptual possibility. Many hypotheses, albeit strictly speaking conceptually possible, 
are not scientifically reasonable or acceptable. I suggest that when we speak of ‘serious 
possibility’ in the context of scientific explanation, we replace it with the term ‘scien-
tific possibility’ in a sui generis sense specific to that context (for more see infra). 
Woodward, as it happens, floats another defence of his use of the concept of ‘se-
rious possibility’. It is a tu quoque: most other theories of causation, he argues, share 
the flaw of centrally relying on a comparable idea, because ‘the properties, variables, 
equations, and state spaces that the theorist uses to model or represent specific cases 
will either directly reflect judgments about which possibilities are to be taken seriously 
or will end up doing largely the same work as such judgments’ (Woodward 2003: 89). 
For example, regularity theorists will have trouble explaining why regularities regard-
ing omissions and absences do not amount to “real” regularities or to the instantiation 
of “real” properties without appealing to a concept very similar to that of serious pos-
sibility (ibid.); idem for David Lewis’ counterfactual theory of causation. As we have 
seen, the problem of background knowledge (i.e. the often indeterminate set of domain- 
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and non-domain specific, case- and non-case specific knowledge needed to assess the 
seriousness of a possibility, the similarity of a set of situations, or the reality of a prop-
erty or regularity) is indeed the bugbear of not only most contemporary theories of cau-
sation, but also of theories of explanation, prediction, and scientific knowledge gener-
ally. Woodward is also quite correct that the ubiquity of this bugbear means that it 
cannot be a fatal objection to any particular theory that it appeals at some point to such 
knowledge.  
Background knowledge can, however, play different roles in scientific inference 
and explanation; and in determining what is possible different types of background 
knowledge can be relied on to different degrees and in more or less well understood 
ways. In what follows I will argue16 that the difficulty of accounting for the explanatory 
role of background knowledge is greater for manipulationism than for a suitably up-
dated regularity theory that relies on ceteris paribus generalisations as vehicles of 
causal explanation; and that the latter is therefore to be preferred. 
 
 
2. Manipulationism and regularities, ceteris paribus 
 
Manipulationism, as we have seen, conceives of causal explanation via the concept 
of a ‘hypothetical or counterfactual experiment’, an intervention that shows how a 
change in the explanans would be a way of changing the explanandum. It requires in-
terventions that are neither logically impossible nor ‘ill-defined for conceptual or met-
aphysical reasons’ (Woodward 2003: 128), though not necessarily physically achieva-
ble. For example, we can correctly judge that ‘the moon causes the tides’, because the 
relevant intervention is conceptually clear, despite the fact that it is probably impossible 
to physically change (the position of) the moon without in the course of such an inter-
vention also impacting the tides (Woodward 2003: 131). Beyond changing X in a way 
that does not directly affect Y, Woodward further stipulates that interventions must be 
actual causes of X taking on some particular value x, in other words, that other possible 
direct causes of the value of X have been fixed at their actual values (Woodward 2003: 
98; see also footnote nº 15). The concept of an ‘intervention’ therefore involves in its 
very definition the idea of other causes not on the path from the intervention variable 
to the variable intervened on, yet part of the variable set that describes the causal sys-
tem, remaining unchanged (Woodward 2003: 98). This is identical to the notion of the 
appropriate set of cetera remaining pares. 
Since ‘invariance’ is itself characterised as a property of generalisations under in-
terventions thus defined, we can say that the ‘other things being equal’ idealisation per-
                                               
16 In a manner Woodward anticipated, see Woodward 2003: 384n. 
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meates manipulationism from start to finish (cf. Henschen 2015). Why then would the-
ories of ceteris paribus-generalisations that are explicitly based on the latter be ‘funda-
mentally flawed’ (Woodward 2003: 308), while invariant generalisations are not? Take 
a typical empirical generalisation of the special sciences, e.g. Okun’s law, which states 
that a 2% increase in GDP growth is associated with a 1% decrease in the rate of un-
employment. The “law” does not satisfy many of the criteria for lawfulness frequently 
considered standard in the philosophical literature. In particular, it is not clear whether 
the generalisation is universal, strict, as well as counterfactual-supporting, or necessary 
in a sense distinct from logical or conceptual/metaphysical necessity. Philosophers of 
the special sciences attempt to tackle two of these issues, the lack of universality and 
the proneness to exceptions of almost all generalisations in these domains, by arguing 
that candidate laws are generalisations hedged by a ceteris paribus-clause (henceforth, 
‘CP laws’); a standard theory of CP laws is the ‘completer account.’17 
In its simplest version, a completer account stipulates that an otherwise law-like 
but non-strict generalisation of the form ‘All As are Bs’—i.e. a generalisation of this 
form that is true and otherwise comparable to a genuine law of nature despite the fact 
that some As are not Bs—qualifies as a law if it is possible to specify a condition C such 
that when C is the case, all As are Bs (or such that ∀x [(Ax & Cx) ⊃ Bx]). Condition C, 
so the idea, functions as a ‘completer’ of the non-strict generalisation by backing it up 
with a strict one. Woodward holds that there are three fundamental problems with com-
pleter accounts: (i) explanatory information must be information that is epistemically 
accessible, yet C is usually unknown or only partially known, because it refers to an 
indefinite or potentially infinite number of causal factors; hence CP laws cannot be 
used to successfully explain. (ii) there are few, if any, actual examples of truly excep-
tionless laws to be found in science, even in physics. (iii) there are many non-strict 
generalisations with completers that we would not naturally regard as laws, or as ex-
planatory (Woodward 2003: 209).  
None of (i)-(iii) are fatal, as I have previously argued (Kowalenko 2011, 2014 this 
journal). Take (i), epistemic inaccessibility: statements of the form ‘CP, All As are Bs’ 
can be interpreted to mean the same as ‘All As in C are B’, where this is a two part-
claim: the explicit claim that a finite and determinate number of conditions {C1 … Cn} 
need to obtain for the generalisation to be true, and the implicit claim that an opaque 
and potentially infinite set of further conditions {Cn + 1, Cn + 2, ...} are nomically irrele-
vant to the generalisation, given the evidence in its support (Kowalenko 2014: 147; cf. 
                                               
17 Completer accounts explain how laws of nature could have exceptions without, however, 
necessarily resolving all other outstanding issues with ‘laws’ (see e.g. Fodor 1991: 22). They 
have been proposed in different forms by Hempel 1965 (arguably also Hempel 1988), Hausman 
1988, 1992, Fodor 1991, Pietroski and Rey 1995, Carrier 1998, Cartwright 2002, Steinberg, 
Layne et al. 2012, Strevens 2012, 2014; Pemberton and Cartwright 2014; Kowalenko 2011, 
2014, among others. 
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Strevens 2012, Schurz 2014). In other words, CP clauses when spelt out explicitly state 
the causal factors that are known, given the evidence, to interfere with the truth of the 
generalisation, while implying that other causal factors are not thus known (ibid.). 
Hence, in order to explain via a CP generalisation it is contra Woodward sufficient to 
non-trivially characterise the explicit (transparent, determinate, and epistemically ac-
cessible) part of the content of its CP clause, and unnecessary to perform the impossible 
feat of describing its implicit (opaque, indeterminate, and epistemically inaccessible) 
content (cf. Woodward 2003: 308). Depending on the scientific field, the explicit part 
of a given CP clause can be supplied by a variety of scientific methods commonly used 
to derive a generalisation from evidence, such as: the methodologies used in single and 
comparative case studies, qualitative ethnographic approaches, as well as quantitative 
methods such as Randomised Controlled Trials, structural equation modeling, multi-
variate regression and statistical curve-fitting (see Kincaid 1995: 63-84; Kowalenko 
2007, 2014: 150; Steinberg, Layne et al. 2012; and infra).  
(ii) no exception-less laws: the view that there are very few or no strict law-like 
empirical regularities has been forcefully argued by Cartwright 1983, 1999 for nature 
in general, and it has been a staple of (the philosophy of) the social sciences since at 
least J.S. Mill.18 Recently the consensus has begun to fray somewhat: a number of au-
thors suggest that there could be exception-less natural laws after all (Earman and Rob-
erts 1999, Earman, Roberts et al. 2002, Gildenhuys 2010), even in the biological and 
social sciences (Elgin 2006; Kincaid 1995). This is of course also Hempel 1965, 1988’s 
position. Even Cartwright 2002 and Pemberton and Cartwright 2014 now think that 
laws of nature can be seen as strict, on condition of an ontologically correct interpreta-
tion of their relata in terms of capacities or dispositions (cf. Mumford 2004). On my 
view, ceteris paribus-laws properly construed similarly are strict laws, although I do 
not require any particular ontological interpretation. Overall, I take the jury on this 
question to be very much out. 
(iii) The claim that there are fatal counterexamples in the form of obviously spuri-
ous or vacuous CP generalisations with completers has been popular ever since Haus-
man suggested ‘ceteris paribus, all dogs have six legs’ as a problem case (Hausman 
1988: 309); and Fodor queried the difference between ‘it’ll fly ceteris paribus’ and ‘it’ll 
fly unless it doesn’t’ (Fodor 1991: 22). The difficulty is evident: under entirely con-
ceivable albeit somewhat fantastical conditions all dogs would indeed have six legs, so 
the generalisation does have a “completer” of sorts. Any occurrence of a non-six-legged 
dog could be chalked up to the completer’s failure to materialise. And on pain of saying 
precisely what we actually mean by ‘ceteris paribus,’ any airplane’s or other potentially 
airborne object’s failure to become such could be explained (away) by appealing to the 
                                               
18 See e.g. Mill 1843, 1882: Book 6, Chapter III; also Popper 1935, 1957, Nagel 1952, and  
Feigl and Broadbeck 1953: chapter 7. 
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fact that another more-or-less fantastical yet possible completer failed to be instantiated 
in the circumstances. The conclusion seems to impose itself that reality cannot in prin-
ciple contradict CP statements, rendering the latter either vacuous or spurious. Yet, the 
charge is false when CP laws are understood correctly as referring to a finite set of 
factors determined by a particular scientific model or theory supported by empirical 
data. For none of the spurious examples in the literature are associated with a scientifi-
cally reasonable or plausible model able to show how the relevant generalisation is 
based on evidence interpreted by such a model. 
Let us assume, for instance, that Fodor’s ‘it’ll fly ceteris paribus’ refers to an air-
plane prototype in the course of construction. Suppose, further, that we inferred it from 
a set of CP generalisations in aerodynamics, aeronautical engineering, and other rele-
vant truths about planes of the same kind as the prototype. We know, in particular, that 
for the prototype to become airborne it needs to be built in such a way that lift, drag, 
weight, and thrust forces are at specific ratios. A structural equation model derived from 
experience that describes these relations could be used to provide an important part of 
the content of the completer in this instance (Drela 1999: 5). Suppose, finally, that the 
plane fails to fly despite these forces being at the correct ratios and other relevant con-
ditions also being satisfied, and that someone attributes this to ‘diabolic influence’—to 
use Hempel 1988’s example of a spurious interferer. We would be entitled to say that 
the CP clause hedging our statement implicitly rules out such influence, because dia-
bolic forces were not part of the model of the forces governing airplanes that we used 
to derive the prediction. They are not part of any scientifically reasonable model, in 
fact, and we would not consider the model’s failure to make room for Satan’s potential 
meddling a falsification of it and the generalisations we derive from it. We take only 
those factors to require explicit mention in the ceteris paribus condition that are caus-
ally relevant, given our best current scientific knowledge (Kowalenko 2014: 147).  
Mutatis mutandis for most counterexamples in the literature that putatively estab-
lish the vacuity of CP generalisations (for other examples, see e.g. Kowalenko 2011: 
448-449, 2014: 142). Yet, we evidently cannot say that a hypothetical causal factor such 
as ‘diabolic force’ is not a scientifically possible interferer in aerodynamics—in Wood-
ward’s terms, a serious possibility—without making use of theoretical background 
knowledge. Deeply steeped as we are in a physicalist worldview and a host of related 
background assumptions, we rule out such forces almost a priori: their inclusion would 
cause too much theoretical disruption in our physical theory as well as in our philo-
sophical outlook.19 Almost all causal inference and explanation ultimately relies on an 
                                               
19 Kuhn taught us, of course, that if the existence and constant operation of a hitherto unnoticed 
force were robustly confirmed in numerous subsequent observations across numerous different 
experiments, a theoretical and philosophical tipping point could be reached (all else being 
equal) that would force us to conclude that our initial model—and paradigm—must have been 
misspecified. 
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amorphous body of tacit background knowledge and judgment that is famously re-
sistant to theoretical description and modelling (see e.g. Polanyi 1962: 91ff; Dreyfus 
and Dreyfus 1986; Kamps 2005; and infra). Nonetheless, I think it can be shown both 
that CP generalisations represent viable vehicles of explanation, causal and otherwise, 
especially in the social sciences; and that they are in crucial respects superior to invar-
iant generalisations—in particular in the way they allow us to deal with the bugbear of 
background knowledge.20  
 
 
3. CP generalisations in Social Scientific Method 
 
CP generalisations are ubiquitous all-purpose vehicles for the representation of 
explanatory background knowledge in a way that invariant generalisations are not. This 
makes them vastly preferable for encoding or representing our causal knowledge, es-
pecially in the social sciences. To show this, I survey some of the most widely used 
methodologies of the social sciences—case studies, comparative small-N studies, ran-
domised controlled trials (RCTs), ethnographic studies, as well as structural equation 
modeling—and argue in each case that: it would be less natural and more cumbersome 
to try to represent the output of the relevant method in the form of invariant generalisa-
tions, rather than CP ones; that in some instances, it would be strictly impossible; and 
finally, that this is because in each methodology causal and non-causal background 
knowledge mesh in a way that cannot easily be accounted for in manipulationist terms.  
 
3.1 Case studies 
 
I begin with case studies, the in-depth and multi-faceted investigation of a single 
social phenomenon, episode, or context. Case study methodology often invokes multi-
ple qualitative or ‘mixed’ research methods such as participant observation, long inter-
views, archival and socio-historical research, action research, historical process tracing, 
content analysis, ethnographic decision tree modelling, etc., as well as purely quantitive 
                                               
20 Others have provided strong arguments for the view that manipulationism is at odds with the 
methods of the social sciences. Boumans 2003, for example, points out that manipulationism is 
ill equipped to account for inference from passive observation, a much more common practice 
in the social sciences than active manipulation; Cartwright 2007 says it gives a sufficient con-
dition for causal inference only for ideal experimental settings far removed from the conditions 
under which it takes place in real life; Reiss 2007 notes that it assumes the existence in social 
contexts of robust causal relations that do not break down under intervention; and Russo 2011 
claims it does not provide a suitable causal test in contexts in which interventions are not phys-
ically or ethically possible (see Russo 2014 for a summary). However, none of these authors 
contrast manipulationism with a theory of explanation based on CP laws specifically in terms 
of its treatment of social scientific background knowledge. 
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statistical analyses (see e.g. Yin 2009; Woodside 2010). Generalisation of the findings 
is an often explicit, though not undisputed, goal (see Platt 1988; Hammersley, Foster et 
al. 2000; Evers and Wu 2006; Steinberg 2015). Countering the argument that any at-
tempt to infer universal propositions is inappropriate when just one instance has been 
observed, Yin points out that generalisation is not necessarily from a sample to a popu-
lation, as it can also be from a set of data generated in one singular episode or context 
to a theory. His term for this type of inference is ‘analytic generalisation,’ others prefer 
‘theoretical generalisation’ or ‘theoretical analysis’ (Yin 2009: 14ff; Mitchell 1983: 
189). Like experiments, case studies can be used to test or expand theoretical proposi-
tions, and they are particularly useful when the studied phenomenon is not yet suffi-
ciently clearly theorised or is likely to be the result of causal relationships that are too 
complex for quantitative survey, causal modelling, or experimental strategies (Yin 
2009: 14ff).  
Insofar as the theoretical propositions established by generalisation from a single 
case study are in fact general, however, they will in almost all actual examples have a 
wide range of exceptions. Generalisations from case studies are thus subject to a ceteris 
paribus condition: to preserve their truth value they have to be hedged by exception 
clauses, i.e. have the form of a CP generalisation or a set of them. Invariant generali-
sations, on the other hand, will often be very hard to derive from the data. For illustra-
tion, let’s look at an early and now classic single case study in sociology, Jahoda, Laz-
arsfeld et al. 1933.21 The authors studied the effects of mass unemployment on a 1930s 
mining community in Marienthal, Austria. Using activity and attitudinal criteria, they 
proposed a four-part typology of families coping with the consequences of unemploy-
ment of the main bread winner: the ‘unbroken’, ‘resigned’, ‘in despair’, and ‘apathetic’ 
family (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld et al. 1971: 45-56). Jahoda et al. found that several years 
after the closure of the main mine in town, out of a total of 478 families, 23% were 
unbroken, 70% resigned, and 7% either in despair or apathetic (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld et 
al. 1971: 56). They interpret the results as lending support to the conclusion that mass 
unemployment leads to resignation and apathy; rather than, say, to political radicalisa-
tion, an important concern in the 1930s.  
This inference is clearly ceteris paribus, as the typology itself shows that for a 
large group of people (23%) unemployment did not such thing, suggesting that addi-
tional factors must have an impact on the causal link between the two variables.22 Alt-
hough the authors take an explicitly methodological holist approach to their study (‘The 
                                               
21 Page references are to the first English edition Jahoda, Lazarsfeld et al. 1971.  
22 The criteria used to establish the typology were themselves exception-prone. For example, 
the authors considered absence of ‘careful maintenance of the family budget’ to be a character-
istic of one category of families, while acknowledging that all unemployed families were found 
to display varying degrees of irrational spending (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld et al. 1971: 55). 
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object of this investigation was the unemployed community, not the unemployed indi-
vidual. Character traits were given little attention’, Jahoda, Lazarsfeld et al. 1971: 2), 
they acknowledge that the sample they studied may have been skewed by individual 
character traits: ‘probably some of the most active and energetic families had already 
escaped […] by emigrating before we came to Marienthal’ (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld et al. 
1971: 57). Thus, despite their declared methodological orientation Jahoda et al. do in 
fact display interest in the question how ‘an individual’s life history affects his powers 
of resistance during unemployment’ (Jahoda, Lazarsfeld et al. 1971: 89). They explic-
itly correlate resignation during the crisis with either (a) traces of earlier resignation, or 
(b) a previous life of particularly high ambitions/standard of living, while explaining 
cases of a member of the (b) group not experiencing resignation by their ‘adaptability’ 
(Jahoda, Lazarsfeld et al. 1971: 94-97). Meanwhile, families with “normal” previous 
lives that display no clearly distinguishing features are found among all four types, and 
the authors speculate similarly that here, too, ‘character traits’ were the decisive factor 
(Jahoda, Lazarsfeld et al. 1971: 98).  
So we see a complex interplay between ‘unemployment’, ‘life history,’ and ‘en-
ergy,’ ‘adaptability,’ and an unspecified further range of ‘character traits.’ How could 
one operationalise these observations in manipulationist terms? Recall from the boulder 
example that causal explanation calls for answers to what-if-things-had-been-different 
questions, and that the latter require us to make judgments about the possibility of 
events based on comparisons between relevantly similar causal systems. Although we 
may have hunches about the types of factor that are relevant to the link between unem-
ployment and resignation, not all of these are necessarily causal or understood in their 
causal efficacy, and we certainly do not know anything like the complete set V of causal 
variables relevant to a given Marienthal family in its social context. We therefore have 
trouble estimating degrees of similarity between relevant causal systems—say between 
families with a previous life history of high ambition and those with low ambition—
and hence cannot say what the counterfactual dependencies are. 
Generally speaking, it seems that true invariant generalisations cannot reliably be 
formulated without quite extensive prior causal background knowledge. Yet the back-
ground knowledge relevant to generalisations in the social sciences is often either not 
causal at all, or not easily representable in terms of other factors whose causal role is 
well understood (proxy variables, etc.). The problem is not quite the same for CP gen-
eralisations: a completer {C1 … Cn} may contain causal or non-causal information or 
both simultaneously, for example indiscriminately list character traits, life histories, as 
well as economic data, etc. This is crucial, as it allows us to more comfortably encode 
our background knowledge regarding the reasons why Jahoda et al.’s conclusion has a 
high number of exceptions. The ostensibly causal claim that ‘mass unemployment leads 
to resignation and apathy’ is hence best seen as a causal CP claim. It is not hard to find 
other seminal causal claims in the social sciences based on case studies that for the same 
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reasons are most naturally expressed in CP generalisations—Malinowski 2005 (1922), 
Liebow 2003 (1967), Allison 1971, Geertz 1971, come to mind. Case study methodol-
ogy generally seems inhospitable to manipulationism. 
 
3.2 Comparative small-N studies 
 
Much the same can be said about comparative small-N studies. Here the researcher 
compares a handful of cases with the aim of setting up matching and contrasting cases 
in a way that would allow identification of primary variables of interest, and (perhaps) 
achieve the equivalent of controlling for exogenous factors. The comparative method 
is invaluable for concept formation and the formulation of general explanatory ideas, 
but it does not seem particularly suitable for a causal account of explanation (cf. Brady 
and Collier 2010: 10), especially a manipulationist one. For matching and contrasting 
cases is not likely to succeed at controlling exogenous variables in the way required by 
manipulationism, by holding fixed at their actual values all variables in the representa-
tion not currently on the X-to-Y path. Usually, the N is not nearly large enough to do 
this even statistically. Despite this limitation comparative studies like case studies are 
a sine qua non of much social science, perhaps because the operant notion of explana-
tion in the fields employing this method is precisely not a manipulationist one, not even 
implicitly or ideally. For if we try to derive universal propositions from comparative 
method—through what King, Keohane et al. 1994: 56ff call ‘descriptive inference’—
these will often have to be hedged generalisations, not invariant ones.  
Kitschelt 1986, for example, in a well-known study looks at the anti-nuclear power 
movements in France, Sweden, the United States, and Germany. He argues that notable 
differences in mobilisation strategy employed by these movements in pursuit of their 
goals as well as their differential impact can be explained by the same set of variables, 
namely a particular configuration of resources, institutional arrangement, and historical 
precedent, that together determine a given democratic nation’s ‘political opportunity 
structure’. Kitschelt does not hold that political opportunity structure fully determines 
the dynamics of social movements, only that it ‘explains a good deal […] if other de-
terminants are held constant’ (Kitschelt 1986: 57-58, my emphasis). Although the au-
thor does not use the expression, his conclusion is most naturally summarised in terms 
of a CP generalisation—in fact, it must be. For even if we interpret the term ‘determi-
nation’ in the quote causally, Kitschelt 1986’s claim cannot be construed in terms of an 
interventionist causal claim: the notion of an intervention is conceptually unclear in his 
context.  
As in the moon and tides case, we cannot even in principle conceive of an inter-
vention on opportunity structure that would not simultaneously influence a panoply of 
other country specific cultural and political factors that would, in turn, impinge on so-
cial movement dynamics. Generally, it is not only physically impossible to manipulate 
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many important social causal factors in order to test their effects, such as, say, race or 
gender influence on wages, even a fictitious intervention on these types of variable 
might not be conceivable in a given social context without the intervention affecting 
the way they are related to their effects in that context. But we do want to say that race 
and gender are causes of wage disparity; idem for our standard ways to manipulate 
macroeconomic properties such as inflation or household income (money supply, in-
terest rates, wages), and so on. As a result, constructing social scientific explanations 
in terms of invariant generalisations based on knowledge generated from comparative 
small-N studies often often does not work. No such problems, by contrast, for CP ge-
neralisations: given Kitschelt’s explicit proviso above, it seems that they are in fact the 
only way in which a general conclusion of any sort could be drawn from a study such 
as his. I venture the claim that the same will be true of most comparative small-N stud-
ies. 
 
3.3 Randomised Controlled Trials 
 
Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) face problems of generalisation similar to 
those of case studies. RCTs are designed specifically to analyse the causal effect of a 
given causal intervention in contexts where we lack information about what further 
factors might influence the effect: a randomly selected group of individuals is exposed 
to a treatment—a cause—whose effects are under study, while a similarly selected con-
trol group is not. (Although they may receive a placebo, making it impossible for them 
to determine in which group they are). As a result of randomisation, which distributes 
even unknown confounders more or less identically in the treatment group and in the 
control, a well-designed RCT will provide an unbiased estimate of the true causal effect 
of a given treatment in a given context, i.e. it will be internally valid. RCTs are ‘con-
venient ways to introduce experimenter-controlled variance [i.e. manipulation]—if you 
want to see what happens, then kick it and see, twist the lion’s tail’ (Deaton and Cart-
wright 2016: 58). Yet, a core difficulty, for example for the purposes of formulating 
clinical practice or predicting the efficiency of government policy, is that this is true 
only for the population from which subjects were selected: if our goal is to export the 
causal conclusions of the RCT from the experimental population to a larger and differ-
ent target population, then we cannot be assured of the same conclusions in the target 
without presupposing the trial’s external validity, or generalisability (see e.g. Deaton 
and Cartwright 2016). 
Glennerster 2012 recognises this problem in the case of government policy evalu-
ation (Glennerster 2012: R11). She argues that to improve our grasp of the context sen-
sitivity of a given policy intervention, we need: a thorough theoretical understanding of 
the mechanism by which treatment and expected outcome are related; knowledge of the 
manner and process through which treatment was implemented; as well as evidence 
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from non-randomised studies and qualitative data (Glennerster 2013: 395ff). Take, for 
example, school-based programs of deworming. We know that deworming leads to in-
creased school attendance by pupils across many different countries, because the bio-
medical mechanism by which deworming pills reduce parasites and increase health is 
well understood, as is the causal link between overall health and school attendance. 
Medical background knowledge suggests that these links are likely to be stable across 
all human populations. By contrast, programs designed to improve the quality of gov-
ernment social services through information campaigns that aim to increase citizen ad-
vocacy can be expected to be highly sensitive to differences in institutional context, in 
particular to the degree of government responsiveness to local political pressure (Glen-
nerster 2013: 398).  
Glennerster therefore suggests that we crack open the “black box” of external va-
lidity by carefully distinguishing between general principles about human behaviour 
provided by theory, on the one hand, and the differences in local conditions and trial 
implementation that are responsible for frequent breakdowns of RCT generalisability, 
on the other (Glennerster 2013: 398, 2017). Notice that the black box cannot be cracked 
open if we limited ourselves to manipulationist methodology, however. We may have 
a satisfactory representation of the causal system in which an intervention on parasitic 
worms via administration of a drug leads to health and higher school attendance. But 
no such construct is available for the route by which an increase in the available infor-
mation about the quality of government services causes increased advocacy, and via the 
latter their improvement; we would need a causal model of the entire political economy 
of a country. Glennerster is explicit that qualitative background knowledge is often in-
dispensable to estimate the external validity of RCTs; in fact, she leaves it open whether 
the very theory grounding our understanding of how treatment and outcome are related 
must rely on causal mechanism at all: all we need is a ‘theory of change’ that specifies 
a ‘logical chain of how program inputs achieve changes in outcomes’ (Glennerster 
2013: 181ff; emphasis mine).  
I suggest that the task of integrating what we can learn from a given RCT with 
qualitative knowledge from non-randomised studies and case studies is easier, if we 
conceive of the relevant conclusions as couched in CP generalisations. After all, the 
theoretical rationale for RCTs is a ceteris paribus-thought, too: an ideal RCT is, by 
definition, a RCT such that all factors that can produce (or eliminate) a causal depend-
ence between the cause C and effect E are exactly the same in the treatment group and 
control, except for C (Cartwright 2009: 64). In other words, a trial in which, everything 
else being equal, C causes E. Therefore, the evidential import of RCTs is naturally 
described in terms of appropriately phrased CP generalisations. It is important, again, 
for my purposes, that causal and non-causal CP regularities mesh better (especially in 
terms of logical inference relations) than causal models mesh with non-causal models 
or with non-causal descriptive knowledge; thus we can expect CP generalisations to 
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make the task of conjoining these different types of knowledge easier. To take a simple 
example: given that ‘CP All As are Bs’ and that ‘CP Bs cause Cs’, we can infer that 
‘CP As cause Cs,’ despite the fact that the latter generalisation is a causal one and the 
former is not, and notwithstanding that the content of the CP clause of each proposition 




The case for the explanatory use of CP generalisations is easily made for purely 
qualitative studies. Take, for example, ethnography, a qualitative research method em-
ploying long-term ‘participant observation’, ‘thick description’, and other observational 
methods for data collection. Ethnography avoids non-qualitative approaches because 
ethnographers, anthropologists, and sociologists see the background knowledge re-
quired to make the (causal) assumptions underlying causal modeling as leading to an 
illicit imposition of an a priori structure on social inquiry (Hammersley 1992: 11-12, 
cited in Mitchell 2007: 56). Descriptive observational methods are favoured because 
they issue (it is hoped) in an inductive or abductive process by which theoretical models 
and classifications are derived from direct observations that describe the processes at 
work—“description is explanation!” being the slogan.  
Ethnographers and cultural anthropologists have come to see social processes as 
primarily generated by a web of meanings that we have spun ourselves; its description 
(‘thick description’) requires the ethnographer to enter the imaginative universe within 
which the cultures’s signs and behaviour have meaning, the ultimate aim being the ‘en-
largement of human discourse’ via the translation of meaning from one culture to an-
other (Geertz 1973: 13-14). Geertz interprets for example the popular practice of betting 
on cockfights among Balinese men as an emblem (a symbol) of social relationships in 
local society—in particular, kinship, village, and status relationships (Geertz 1971). 
Arguably (though not uncontroversially so), ethnography’s concern like that of every 
science is ultimately with universal knowledge, and hence with generalisation (Fire-
stone 1993, Williams 2000). It is immediately evident that the type of knowledge re-
quired for thick description is of a different kind than the knowledge required to, say, 
distinguish between the one-boulder and the two-boulder-scenario: it is as much se-
mantic as it is causal. While one may realistically hope that some ethnographic insights 
at least can be formulated in hedged generalisations and that they can in that form be 
                                               
23 The question how the content of the CP clause in ‘CP3 As cause Cs’ could be derived from 
the CP conditions in ‘CP1 All As are Bs’ and ‘CP2 Bs cause Cs’ is, however, complicated. It 
seems that it cannot be simply the conjunction ‘CP1 & CP2’, for it is as unlikely that relations 
between CP clauses are summative as that relations between models are (cf. Kowalenko 2014: 
149). 
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integrated with causal social scientific knowledge, prospects of manipulationist expla-
nation in ethnography appear to be zero. 
 
3.5 Structural Equation Modelling 
 
Last but not least, what about structural equation modeling? Glymour 2004 says 
that Woodward’s manipulationism is in essence nothing but a decomposition and rear-
rangement of the theory of causal Bayes nets, with the concept of intervention as place 
of departure (Glymour 2004: 780, 784; see also Freedman 2007). Woodward himself 
appears to think that the best way to account for the widespread use of structural equa-
tion modeling in the testing of causal claims in economics is via an interventionist con-
cept of causation and generalisations invariant under such interventions (Woodward 
1999, Woodward 2003: 315ff). Structural equation models were probably what he pri-
marily had in mind when he touted manipulationism as ‘fitting’ many social science 
contexts. Pearl 2000 gives as a simple example of such a model the ‘functional causal 
model’ constituted by the two econometric equations ‘Q = b1P + d1I + u1’ and ‘ P = 
b2Q + d2W + u2’, ‘where Q is the quantity of household demand for [a product], P is 
the unit price of [the product], I is household income, W is the wage rate for producing 
[the product], and u1 and u2 represent error terms - unmodeled factors that affect quan-
tity and price, respectively’ (Pearl 2000: 27, citing Goldberger 1992). Each equation is 
intended to represent an autonomous mechanism showing how household income and 
price are an immediate cause of demand, on the one hand, and wages and demand are 
an immediate cause of price, on the other (the model is cyclic); note that u1 and u2 
represent the errors, or “disturbances,” introduced into the causal relationship between 
Q, P and I, and P, Q and W, respectively, by factors omitted in the equations (Pearl 
2000: 27).  
I have previously argued that multivariate regression models can provide the con-
tent of the CP clauses that explicitly or implicitly hedge a number of generalisations in 
the special sciences (2014, this journal). The idea is that the content of a CP clause can 
be interpreted as given by the factors controlled for in the regression model used to 
interpret the evidence in support of the generalisation the clause hedges. Structural 
equation modeling being a second-generation multivariate technique, we can expect the 
same to be true here. The epistemic rationale of structural equation models like that of 
many other scientific methodologies is to identify a causal relation and isolate it (in the 
model) from the impact of potential interfering factors—to hold cetera pares. Hence, I 
argue that structural equation models can naturally be connected to sets of CP state-
ments, e.g. in the case above to the claims ‘CP P and I are immediate causes of Q’ and 
‘CP Q and W are immediate causes of P’, where the unmodeled factors represented by 
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u1 and u2 are “parked” in the respective CP clause.24 Structural equation models are 
often visually represented by Direct Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) (acyclic models are usu-
ally preferred for capturing counterfactual dependence relations). A problem for DAGs 
and the associated models analogous to the problem of external validity in RCTs is their 
transportability (see e.g. Petersen 2011). I propose that this problem is better tackled if 
we think of structural equation models as associated with or implying CP generalisa-
tions. 
For, a DAG will attempt to represent all variables measured and unmeasured that 
are thought to be significant to the relevant causal relationship along with all common 
causes, just as structural equations attempt to capture all modeled factors as well as the 
unmodeled, but known to be potentially relevant, factors in the disturbance term. This 
corresponds (when the attempt to spell them out is made) to the explicit content 
{Xa1 … Xan}, {Xb1 … Xbn}, etc. of the CP clauses CPa, CPb, etc. hedging the correspond-
ing set of CP generalisations. As in the case of the disturbance term, varying degrees 
of scientific investigative effort will yield ceteris paribus conditions of varying com-
plexity, but the crucial point here is that neither ‘CP’ nor ‘u’ should be interpreted as 
explicitly referring to infinities. The explicit meaning at least of a CP clause must be 
redeemable, and so must be the disturbance or error term. We can then view failures of 
transportability as due to discrepancies in the implicit content of the model, i.e. condi-
tions {Xan+1, Xan+2, …}, {Xbn+1, Xbn+2, …}, etc. of the corresponding CP clauses, which 
are never spelt out because it is impossible to do so. These are the potentially infinitely 
many factors that by virtue of being excluded from the model are implicitly declared to 
be irrelevant for the truth or falsity (given the data) of the causal claim or generalisation 
(cf. 2014: 147, this journal). Interpreting structural equation models and DAGs as (as-
sociated with) a network of CP statements in this way presents advantages, because the 
latter can capture not just causal or probabilistic, but also qualitative conditional inde-
pendence relations (see Boutilier, Brafman et al. 2004: 140). This gives us more power 





Woodward’s tu quoque argument, being the fallacy that it is, should be rejected. It 
may be true that all theories of explanation are equally plagued by the role of possibility 
in explanation, but not all theories of explanation are equally germane to all scientific 
practices. I have been concerned to show that at least as far as the social sciences are 
                                               
24 See applications of this idea e.g. in decision and learning theory: Boutilier, Bacchus et al. 
2001; Boutilier, Brafman et al. 2004; McGeachie and Doyle 2004. 
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concerned, a traditional regularity-approach to explanation in terms of CP generalisa-
tions is in many cases superior. Manipulationism, I have argued, presupposes causal 
counterfactual knowledge of a special kind—‘serious possibility’, as evinced in the in-
tuitions of the boulder example—which is not useful in those areas where this 
knowledge is precisely what we lack, or where our conception of ‘serious possibility’ 
in Woodward’s sense meshes in subtle ways with and presupposes non-causal 
knowledge. Not all conceivable ‘counterfactual experiments’ can be associated with 
successful causal explanation (as Woodward 2003: 11 acknowledges), because in social 
science contexts in particular we have no idea what would result from such experi-
ments, despite clearly having some relevant knowledge—as e.g. in the case of Jahoda, 
Lazarsfeld et al. 1971’s families. 
This suggests that the appropriate background knowledge necessary for scientific 
explanation is not counterfactual knowledge of what is ‘seriously possible’ in manipu-
lationist terms, but of what I called ‘scientific possibility’: a modal concept referring to 
a set of possibilities or possibles worlds larger than nomic possibility, yet smaller than 
conceptual/metaphysical possibility. Scientifically possible is that which it is reasona-
ble/justifiable to hypothesise given a specific factual situation, evidence, theory and 
background knowledge. Using a number of examples from the social sciences, I argued 
that the manner in which these elements are welded together in each instance to draw 
particular causal conclusions or formulate generalisations cannot be adequately ex-
plained in manipulationism. For our concept of ‘scientific possibility’ is generated from 
sources that include both qualitative and quantitative, causal and non-causal infor-
mation, and as such transcends the traditional assumptions of causal modeling. CP gen-
eralisations, I have argued, are the best vehicle for encoding such knowledge. 
A methodology based on CP laws as the primary modus of explanation presents a 
more promising avenue for controlling the bugbear of background knowledge, for the 
completer account promises the much-needed flexibility to model how causal and non-
causal knowledge can mesh and interact. In fact, the assumption that completers have 
an explicit, determinate, and in principle fully redeemable, as well as an implicit, inde-
terminate, and irredeemable component, is the best way I can see to theorise ‘scientific 
possibility’, background knowledge, and the way we use the latter to grasp the former. 
What we are implying when we chose not to refer to or describe a factor in our repre-
sentation of the actually obtaining regularities in a given situation, is that it is irrelevant 
to that situation. This judgement is closely connected to our judgment of what is scien-
tifically reasonable, i.e scientific possibility. After all, the completer of a CP clause in 
a scientific context is always the amalgamated output of a number of scientific meth-
odologies, as we have seen, many of which are not based exclusively on causal or nom-
othetic knowledge, but require background understanding of an amorphous type. That 
we cannot simply identify scientific possibility with nomic possibility is in fact the very 
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raison d’être of CP generalisations, but further elaboration of this idea will have to wait 
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